Digital Security for Arrestable Actions

 Last updated on October 30, 2026
 Takes about 20 minutes
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This guide covers digital security if you need to bring your phone to a nonviolent civil disobedience action (aka direct action) where some folks are planning to risk arrest. It's one part of keeping your crew safe. Your action should also plan for physical safety, have a safety team, and make sure everyone knows their rights. Our safety checklist for action organizers can help with all of these.

This guide is written for the following situation:

  • This is an action that is centrally organized enough that you can set agreements around digital security that everyone will follow.
  • You have encouraged most people attending the action to not bring their phone
  • Some people still need their phones to coordinate your deployment (ie: tactical lead, medics, de-escalation team, etc.)
  • The risk of arrest is high, or you are planning to risk arrest.
  • You expect the police may try to use Phone-Cracking Tools (forensic extraction tools)Devices that cops and border agents use to break into seized phones and copy the data off them, sometimes including deleted messages. Cellebrite and GrayKey are the best-known brands. A long random passcode and an up-to-date phone make them much less effective.Learn more: EFF Street Level Surveillance to access the data on the phones they confiscate.
  • You are not concerned with surveillance to and from the action.

If any of these don't apply to your action, you may need to take more precautions. Check out the protest enhanced phone security section or consider bringing a secondary phone (sometimes called a "Burner PhoneA phone that is completely disconnected from your identity, bought with cash and used only a handful of times before it's destroyed. Keeping a burner truly anonymous takes a great deal of work, so for most people we recommend a Secondary Phone ("burner phone" lite)A second phone with as little personal data on it as possible, used for protests and sensitive organizing. If cops seize it, there's much less for them to find. It isn't truly anonymous like a burner phone, and you can reuse it across many actions.Learn more: Secondary Phone Checklist instead.Learn more: Secondary Phone Checklist").

Tip for organizers: In the lead-up to the action, consider hosting a security party so your crew works through these steps together before the day of.

Why does this matter?

We know social movements have been surveilled, infiltrated, discredited, and obstructed by government agents (local cops, FBI, CIA, NSA, etc) for decades. The rise of technology means we’re all being tracked and profiled (even if you've never been arrested).

Even when we are exercising our legal rights to free speech and assembly, there are many government forces that seek to crush dissent and criminalize activists. (See Minnesota 15 case)

But there are actions we can take to protect our movements! This guide offers some simple things we can all do before and during a protest/action to keep ourselves and the most vulnerable folks in our movements safer. Taking these precautions helps protect everyone you organize with (not just you and your data). It isn't a sign or admission of any kind of wrongdoing.

Threats to consider

  • Phone seizure and searching - If arrested, police can try to break into your phone to access your messages, photos, and other private information to use as evidence
  • Monitoring of communications - Police can intercept regular SMS texts and calls to gather info about protest plans and participants
  • Subpoena of your account data or cell carrier data - Cops can get a court order to access your online accounts (like Google or Apple) or your communication/location data from your cell carrier.
  • Informants and undercover agents - People in your meetings or group chats may be passing what they see and read to the police
  • Mapping activist networks - By getting data from one person's phone, police can identify entire communities of activists and organizers connected to them

For everyone participating in the action

For lower-risk arrestable actions, it's best to have everyone either A) leave their phone at home or B) turn off their phones and leave them with a support person. This is often a person doing Jail SupportA support role during an arrestable action or protest. These people support arrestees during and after an action. They track who's been arrested, stay in touch with lawyers, wait outside the jail, and bring people their phones, food, and a ride home once they're released.. This person should either not attend the action or be in a very low-risk position on the far edges of the action.

How to set a phone agreement for your action

  1. Decide which roles actually need a phone. Usually this is only a few people, like the tactical lead, police liaison, or medics. Everyone else leaves their phones with the support person. Anyone in a high arrest risk role should not bring a phone. (Or they should immediately hand it over after deployment.)
  2. Before deployment, the support person collects most phones.
  3. Make a plan for getting phones back to people after they are released. This usually means the jail support person brings the phones to people after they are released.
  4. Share the agreement early and repeat it at trainings and the action briefing.

Tip: If there are a lot of phones and you need to confirm each person is the true owner of the phone they point to in the stack, you can ask them to unlock the phone in your presence.

DO: Install and use the Signal (free) for your activism/political work
DO NOT: Use WhatsApp, Telegram, iMessage, regular texts (for your activism)

How to install and use signal

  1. Install Signal on your phone
  2. Message or call your existing contacts using their phone number or ask someone for their signal username. They must have Signal installed also.

Check out our Signal Checklist for detailed instructions on configuring Signal to be as secure as possible.

The best upgrade everyone can make to their use of Signal is to make sure that disappearing messages are enabled by default. Most activists we talk to haven't enabled this by default. (And most people forget to enable it manually for each new thread.)

This keeps you safe and other people safe. We don't know who's phone will be seized by law enforcement. Even if we believe we're talking about perfectly legal things, the government can find ways to twist our words to attempt to make a case against us for our dissent

There are two things to track related to disappearing messages:

  1. First, change your default so any thread you make has this feature enabled.
  2. Second, make sure it is enabled for threads that other people start: if someone else starts the thread, it may not have disappearing messages enabled. You may need to enable it.

How to enable disappearing messages

  1. To change the default: Open Signal Tap your profile picture Settings Privacy Disappearing Messages set to your desired time (longer or shorter depending on your risk tolerance).
  2. (Android-only) Change your message retention limit: This will delete messages on threads even that don't have disappearing messages turned on. (They will only be deleted on your device.) Open Signal Tap your profile picture Settings Data and storage Manage storage Keep Messages set to your desired max timeframe. Go back a screen and enable Apply limits to linked devices.
  3. To change existing threads: Signal Open the message thread you want to change Click on the person's name (or group name) at the top of the screen Disappearing Messages set to your desired time.
  4. Delete old messages/threads: Disappearing messages does NOT apply retroactively. So you may want to delete old threads on your phone. This will not delete them on other people's phones, unfortunately. So if it is very sensitive, you may need to ask them to also manually delete the thread. (And while you're at it, encourage them to turn on disappearing messages by default!)

Choosing your disappearing message time: How long you set your disappearing times depends on the sensitivity of your messages. A question you might ask yourself is "if someone's device was confiscated or hacked, how important is it that these messages are not accessible?"

  • For chatting about low-risk things with friends, you might choose 4 weeks.
  • For standard political organizing, you might choose 1 week.
  • For a higer-risk actions, you might set it to 1 day or 1 hour or 5 minutes, so the messages are gone before the action starts.
DO: Use Proton Docs (or Cryptpad) for organizing
DO NOT: Use Google Docs for organizing

Google tracks all user activity - including what documents you open, share, and access. Law enforcement can obtain this data through Warrant vs. SubpoenaBoth are legal orders that can force a company to hand over your data. A warrant must be signed by a judge who agrees there's probable cause of a crime, and it can also let police search your home or phone. Many subpoenas need no judge at all, but they don't give the investigator access to as much information. ICE often uses "administrative warrants" signed by an ICE officer, not a judge. These don't give them the right to enter your home without your permission., and they've been known to share it without proper authorization. Doing our organizing outside of Google Docs helps us keep each other more safe.

Proton Docs is a high-quality alternative to Google Docs. Your docs are end-to-end encrypted, which means that even if the authorities accessed Proton's servers, they wouldn't be able to see what was contained in your documents.

How to use Proton Docs

  1. Create a Proton account if you don't have one already — choose the free plan
  2. Visit Proton Drive Click the New button Select New Document
  3. Once your document is ready for sharing, you can click the "Share" button and either share it with other Proton accounts or enable "Create public link" to share with people who don't have a Proton account. Be careful where you share the link since it will be less secure! We recommend using a password if you're turning on "anyone with link can view" mode.

Encourage the people you're organizing with to get a Proton account and you can all move toward being more secure.

Looking for forms? Proton doesn't have a solution like Google Forms. You can try Cryptpad forms or Jotform with the end-to-end encrypted option enabled.

DO: Talk through sensitive details in person, with phones put away
DO NOT: Put who is risking arrest, or the details of the plan, in group chats or shared docs

We are in an era where the federal government is surveilling and prosecuting activists with a level of intensity we haven't seen in decades.

When doing mass organizing, we're always balancing the need for security with the need to grow our movements and build power.

One way we can reduce unnecessary risk is to be careful about what we write down. What we write down often ends up being used against us in court, even if we're using EncryptionScrambling information so that only someone with the right key, like your password or passcode, can read it. To anyone else, encrypted data looks like random, unreadable text.Learn more: EFF Surveillance Self-Defense tools like Signal.

For any organizing involving risking arrest (or highly targeted organizing like ICE watch or Palestine solidarity), it's important to have agreements about what folks will not write down.

How the data ends up in court:

  • Someone's phone is seized. If anyone in a chat is arrested and police get into their phone, they can read every message and document on it.
  • A company hands over your account. Services like Google Docs aren't end-to-end encrypted, so the company can see your documents and give them to police who get a Warrant vs. SubpoenaBoth are legal orders that can force a company to hand over your data. A warrant must be signed by a judge who agrees there's probable cause of a crime, and it can also let police search your home or phone. Many subpoenas need no judge at all, but they don't give the investigator access to as much information. ICE often uses "administrative warrants" signed by an ICE officer, not a judge. These don't give them the right to enter your home without your permission.. In 2025, Google gave ICE a graduate student's account information in response to a subpoena, without telling the student first.
  • Someone in the group is an informant or undercover cop. In the 2026 federal case against the Minnesota 15, undercover agents joined activists' Signal group chats and passed along what they read, which prosecutors then used in court.

How to keep your plans out of the written record

Avoid putting riskier things in writing in messages, documents, or even paper notes.

Before you type/write something, ask yourself: "Would I be ok hearing this read aloud in a court case against me?" If not, save it for an in-person conversation (ideally with all phones/devices in a different room).

Things you may want to avoid writing down:

  • That you are planning to do something that carries the risk of arrest (even a very mild sit-in is usually breaking a trespassing law)
  • Who is participating in the group or action
  • Who is leading
  • For actions: the location, the tactics, identifying information about people involved
  • Other groups involved
  • Jokes/venting/sarcasm that could read as a serious threat/intention.

Last step: Build practices to delete/destroy things you did write down as soon as you no longer need them. This often gets forgotten, so building in accountability systems can help.

Phone lockdown (for everyone bringing a phone)

If you are one of the people bringing a phone and have very sensitive data on your primary phone or are at high-risk of being targeted by the cops, we recommend following all of the steps in this guide using a secondary phone that will have less data on it.

DO: Install updates as soon as you're prompted
DO NOT: Keep pushing the "update later" button

Every time a new operating system update comes out, it is fixing security holes. Each update you haven't installed represents a longer list of ways the cops can hack into your device. Think of it as a big building with more and more doors left unlocked.

If your operating system is not up-to-date, many of the other recommendations in this guide will not protect your data.

Start with your phone. If you're doing something higher risk, make sure to update all your devices.

How to run updates

Because security updates are so important, we designed a tool to walk you through the process.

How to run updates manually

If you prefer to run updates manually, here is how to do it for each device:

DO: Use a random passcode generator to create an 8 to 10-digit code
DO NOT: Use any passcode you thought of yourself (dates, patterns on the keyboard, etc.). Do not use 6-digit passcodes if possible.

How to change your passcode

  1. Generate a random 8 to 10-digit passcode using this random passcode generator. (Don't make one up yourself—humans are bad at choosing randomly!)

  2. Change your passcode:

  3. Practice the new passcode at least 10 times in a row right now so you are more likely to remember it. (Disabling biometrics will force a passcode request every time you lock the phone.)

  4. Write your new passcode on paper and keep it somewhere safe at home until you've memorized it. Then destroy it after 2–3 weeks. Setting a reminder on your phone can help.

How long does it take to crack a passcode?

TypeTime it takes to crack (average)Example
6-digit easy-to-guess patternLess than 24 hours to crack333666 (common pattern) or 110585 (date pattern for Nov 5, 1982)
6-digit random code200 days to crack238253
8-digit random code40+ years to crack34780026

Note: These times only apply to phones. Computers can be cracked much more quickly, and need much stronger passwords.

Sources: The estimates in the table above assume real-world observed attempts/second from police forensic hacking tools. If you need more security, use a 10-digit passcode, which will protect you even under the highest-possible cracking scenarios. See the sources linked in the passcode FAQ here.

How to disable face/fingerprint unlock

(You can leave the rest enabled.)

Caveat: Face and fingerprint unlock let you use stronger passwords without typing them all the time. If you have to choose, it's better to have a longer passcode than to turn off face/fingerprint unlock. If you leave biometrics on, make sure you know how to quickly turn them off if you're heading into a high-risk situation (see tips below).

If your phone is confiscated by law enforcement, one of the biggest risks is exposing your entire network. Even if people aren't using their real name on their Signal account, there is still a unique ID behind every Signal username. And the cops can use this to correlate someone's identity across many seized devices.

You need to both leave AND delete the group:

  • If you only leave the group, old messages stay on your phone as well as the history of who was in the group.
  • If you only delete the group, new messages will still come through and the thread re-appears.

How to leave AND delete a Signal group

  1. Make a plan to re-join afterwards: When headed into a situation with possible arrest, make a list on paper at home or somewhere safe of all the groups and who you need to message who can re-add you after the action or border-crossing is complete.
  2. To leave the group: Signal [Group] Tap the group icon at the top Leave group
    • If you're the only admin, you have to either remove all members or assign another admin.
  3. To delete the group from your phone: Signal Main screen Swipe left on the thread Delete
    • This won't delete it for anyone else.

Security hygiene tips:

  • Set a recurring reminder to clean up your Signal thread every 3 months.
  • Make sure you take note of which groups you are leaving and who you can ask to re-add you after the action.

Note: If you find this process very annoying and cumbersome (because it is!), that's another good reason to use a secondary phone for actions. That phone would only ever be in the one or two groups needed to pull off the action that day.

During the action (if you brought a phone)

When your phone is fully powered off, it's more secure against Phone-Cracking Tools (forensic extraction tools)Devices that cops and border agents use to break into seized phones and copy the data off them, sometimes including deleted messages. Cellebrite and GrayKey are the best-known brands. A long random passcode and an up-to-date phone make them much less effective.Learn more: EFF Street Level Surveillance by the cops. The data is encrypted until after you enter your passcode for the first time.

Therefore, the number one thing you can do to protect your data is turn your phone off as soon as you think your risk of arrest is going up.

How to power off your phone

  1. Practice this a number of times so you can do it quickly.

  2. During the high-risk situation, remind people near you to power off their phones as well.

Trade-offs: We recognize there are trade-offs in turning off your phone. Sometimes it is more important to film the police or coordinate with our allies. Think through what is the priority for you. If you need to film, consider bringing a secondary phone so you have less sensitive data on it.

Not having your phone on you when you are detained is the best way to protect your data and the movement. Powering it fully off is the second best approach.

How to hand your phone to someone not risking arrest

  • If you're planning to risk arrest: turn off your phone and hand it to your designated support person before deployment.
  • If you need a phone during the action: Folks in a support role (tactical, medic, de-escalation, etc) may need a phone during the action. Depending on the action design, and the unpredictability of the cops, they may or may not be able to leave when arrest risk goes up.
    • If your action design allows it and you need your phone up until the last minute, hand it off.
    • If you need your phone and you can't hand it off, make sure you fully power it off before arrest.

After the action

Once the action is over, the documents and chats you made are no longer needed. The longer they stick around, the more chances that they can end up in the hands of the cops through a seized phone, a Warrant vs. SubpoenaBoth are legal orders that can force a company to hand over your data. A warrant must be signed by a judge who agrees there's probable cause of a crime, and it can also let police search your home or phone. Many subpoenas need no judge at all, but they don't give the investigator access to as much information. ICE often uses "administrative warrants" signed by an ICE officer, not a judge. These don't give them the right to enter your home without your permission., or an informant in the group.

Before the action, agree on a cleanup plan. Create an accountability system to help you follow through.

How to clean up after an action

  1. Delete the documents. This includes planning docs, Proton/CryptPad docs, spreadsheets, jail support forms, and any written notes. Then empty the trash.
  2. Shut down the Signal groups: Signal groups can be useful for ongoing organizing but the list of members also presents a risk to everyone if anyone's phone gets seized in the future. Consider moving everyone into a bigger announcement-only group for ongoing organizing rather than keeping that one small group going.
    • Post a message letting everyone know the group is closing, and ask them to delete the chat from their phones. Remove each member yourself to make sure it happens.
    • Delete the chat from your own phone: Signal Main screen Swipe left on the thread Delete. (This won't remove the group from other people's phones, just yours. Disappearing messages will auto-delete from everyone's phones, though.)
  3. If you're not an admin, leave AND delete the group and encourage everyone else to do the same.
  4. Shred any paper notes, maps, or lists.

Have questions? Let us know so we can make these guides more useful.